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Abstract 
This study assesses whether the widely documented momentum profits can be 
attributed to time-varying risk as described by a GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M model. We 
reveal that momentum profits are a compensation for time-varying unsystematic risks, 
which are common to the winner and loser stocks but affect the former more than the 
latter. In addition, we find that, perhaps because losers have a higher propensity than 
winners to disclose bad news, negative return shocks increase their volatility more 
than it increases those of the winners. The volatility of the losers is also found to 
respond to news more slowly, but eventually to a greater extent, than that of the 
winners.  
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1. Introduction 
Momentum strategies that buy recent winners and sell recent losers are profitable over short 
horizons of 3 to 12 months (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Price continuation has prevailed 
over time (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001), across countries (Griffin et al., 2003; Liu et al., 1999; 
Ellis and Thomas, 2003), across industries (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999), across equity 
styles (Chen and De Bondt, 2004) and across asset classes (Okunev and White, 2003). While 
the profitability of relative-strength portfolios is not disputed, there is still a lot of controversy 
as to why these abnormal returns occur. Two explanations have been put forward.  
 
The first is based on psychology and market inefficiency. Behavioral proponents relate price 
under- and over-reaction to cognitive errors that investors make when incorporating 
information into prices. For example, investors may be too quick to draw the conclusion that a 
given stock follows a particular “ideal type” (the representativeness heuristic), and they may 
be too slow to update their beliefs when confronted with new, especially contradictory, 
evidence (the conservatism bias). These behavioral attributes lead first to momentum as stock 
prices react with delay to firm-specific information and, once deviations from equilibrium are 
acknowledged, to subsequent mean reversion (Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998; Hong 
and Stein, 1999).1 This suggests that the irrationality from which agents suffer may push 
prices away from fundamentals and allow profitable mispricings to survive.  
 
The second explanation relies on the notion of market efficiency and argues that the returns of 
the relative-strength portfolios are a fair compensation for the risk and/or trading costs of 
implementing the strategies. On balance, however, the evidence suggests that the profitability 
of the relative-strength portfolios is not solely a compensation for exposure to higher risks 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Chan et al., 1996; Fama and French, 1996; Griffin et al., 2003; 
Karolyi and Kho, 2004; Sadka, 2006).2 Studies that allow for time-variation in systematic 
risks reach conflicting conclusions. While Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), Wu (2002) and 
Wang (2003) explain the profitability of momentum strategies through time-variation in 
expected returns, Grundy and Martin (2001), Griffin et al. (2003) and Nagel and Lewellen 
1 Other behavioral deficiencies that investors may suffer from include biased self-attribution and overconfidence 
(Daniel et al., 1998), and bounded rationality (Hong and Stein, 1999). 
2 Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) estimate a market model, to which Chan et al. (1996) and Fama and French (1996) 
add the return of portfolios sorted on size and book-to-market value. Griffin et al. (2003) look at macroeconomic 
and financial factors that are in the spirit of the model of Chen et al. (1986). Sadka (2006) looks at the role of 
liquidity risk. Karolyi and Kho (2004) use bootstrap experiments and a wide range of return-generating 
processes. 
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(2003) argue that the momentum returns are too large to be accounted for in terms of time-
varying risks. It is important to note also that a rationale related to transaction costs has been 
put forward as an explanation for the momentum profits. Lesmond et al. (2004) indeed argue 
that momentum profits have little to do with risk as they are simply an illusion induced by 
trading costs.3  
 
The contribution of this article to the momentum literature is with regards to the time-varying 
unsystematic risk of the winners and the losers and to the role it may have in explaining the 
abnormal returns of momentum strategies. While several studies look at variations in 
systematic risk (Grundy and Martin, 2001; Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002; Wu, 2002; Griffin 
et al., 2003; Wang, 2003; Nagel and Lewellen, 2006), this study is the first to look at 
variations in the unsystematic risks of the winner and loser portfolios. We do this within a 
GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M framework.4 The rationale for choosing a GARCH(1,1)-M model stems 
from the idea that in rational markets, volatility is often viewed as being commensurate with 
news or information flow, and indeed, the autocorrelation in information arrival (“news evens 
happen in bunches”) is one of the primary rationalizations of the volatility clustering that is 
almost universally observed in asset returns. The conditional standard deviation term in the 
mean equation captures the time-varying relationship between total risk and returns, and thus 
our contribution is to link momentum profits with the impact of news on returns. We use the 
GJR variant of the basic GARCH model in order to allow for a possible asymmetry in the 
relationship between the returns to the winner and loser portfolios and the volatility. By using 
a conditional model, we are able to capture the possibility that the risks of the winners and the 
losers may change in a predictable, but different, way over time. This suggests that a model 
that explicitly allows for risk to be time-dependent might explain the abnormal returns of the 
momentum strategies. Our approach is an alternative to one where pre-specified conditional 
variables, such as macroeconomic or firm-specific influences, are used as the risk factors in a 
conditional pricing model. Most such models have largely failed to explain the profitability of 
relative strength portfolios, and thus an advantage of the method that we employ is that it does 
not require any a priori specification of the set of risk factors in order to allow for time-
varying risk. 
3 Lesmond et al. (2004) show that momentum strategies are highly trading intensive and pick up stocks that are 
expensive and risky (small, high beta, illiquid, off-NYSE extreme performers). Besides, the momentum profits 
are mainly driven by the losers (Hong et al., 2000) and thus short-sale costs also need to be taken into account. 
4  GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M stands for Glosten et al. (1993) Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity of order 1,1 with a Mean term that models the conditional risk premium. A number of studies 
(Nelson, 1991; Glosten et al., 1993; Rabemananjara and Zakoian, 1993) show that good news (measured by 
positive return shocks) and bad news (measured by negative return shocks) have an asymmetric impact on the 
conditional variance of stock returns.  
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 We draw the following two conclusions from our analysis. First, we identify some clear 
patterns in the volatility of the winner and loser portfolios. The volatility of the winners is 
found to be more sensitive to recent news than that of the losers, whereas by contrast, the 
volatility of the losers is found to be more sensitive to distant news than that of the winners. 
Besides, the volatility of the losers (with an average volatility half-life of 24 months and 13 
days) shows a higher level of persistence than that of the winners (whose volatility half-life 
only equals 3 months and 5 days on average). 
 
The second conclusion of this article is with regards to the hypothesis that the momentum 
returns are a compensation for time-varying unsystematic risk as modeled by the GJR-
GARCH(1,1)-M model. We show that the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M terms, when added to the 
traditional market and Fama and French models, explain the abnormal performance of the 
momentum strategies without the need to resort to the transactions cost and illiquidity issues 
that were the focus of Lesmond et al. (2004) or Sadka (2006). Interestingly, neither the GJR-
GARCH(1,1) nor the GARCH(1,1)-M specifications alone could account for the abnormal 
return of the relative-strength portfolios. It is therefore both the asymmetric response of the 
losers to good and bad news and the conditional risk premium embedded in the GARCH(1,1)-
M model that explain the profitability of the momentum strategies. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the dataset, the 
methodology employed to construct the momentum portfolios and the models used to adjust 
for risk. Section 3 analyzes how recent news, distant news and negative return shocks impact 
the volatility of the winners and losers. It also tests whether the momentum profits are a 
compensation for time-varying unsystematic risk common to the winners and losers. Finally, 
section 4 concludes the paper with a summary of our findings.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
Monthly UK stock prices adjusted for dividends are obtained from the London Share Price 
Database over the period 28 February 1975 to 31 December 2001.5 To address problems of 
survivorship bias, we also include stocks that were delisted due to merger, acquisition or 
5 The returns to the Fama-French factor portfolios that we employ subsequently are only available to December 
2001, which necessitates this truncation of our sample period.  
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bankruptcy. The sample includes all companies with at least 3 months of available returns. A 
total of 6,155 companies are considered.  
 
All stocks are ranked and sorted into 10 equally-weighted portfolios based on their past J-
month cumulative returns (J = 3, 6, 12 months). The decile portfolio with the highest 
cumulative return is termed the “winner” portfolio, while the decile portfolio with the lowest 
cumulative return is called the “loser” portfolio. The return on the momentum portfolio is 
then measured as the return difference between the winner and loser portfolios over the next K 
months (K = 3, 6, 12 months).6 The resulting portfolio is referred to as the J-K momentum 
portfolio. The procedure is rolled forward at the end of each holding period to produce new 
winner, loser and momentum portfolios. The formation of the relative-strength portfolios is 
therefore non-overlapping, thus reducing the trading frequency and the transaction costs 
incurred in portfolio construction and ensuring that statistical tests are valid without requiring 
modification of the standard errors. Our framework is also more realistic in terms of the 
behavior of investors than one based on overlapping portfolios where they would presumably 
have to vary the amount of wealth devoted to the strategies over time.  
 
Traditionally, performance has been measured by regressing a portfolio’s returns on a set of 
systematic risk factors emanating from the CAPM of Sharpe (1964) or the three-factor model 
of Fama and French (1993), which can be expressed respectively as 
( ) tftMtt RRR εβα +−+=        (1) 
( ) tttftMtt hHMLsSMBRRR εβα +++−+=     (2) 
where Rt is either the return on the momentum portfolio or the return of the winner and loser 
portfolios in excess of the risk-free rate, Rft is the three-month Treasury bill rate, RMt is the 
value-weighted market return on all stocks quoted on the London Stock Exchange, SMBt and 
HMLt are UK-based returns of Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market value 
portfolios as provided by Nagel7 and εt is a white noise error term. The performance of the 
portfolios is then evaluated by testing the statistical significance of the α coefficient in (1) and 
(2).8 
6 We also employed holding periods of 15 months’ duration, but the results were qualitatively identical to those 
employing a 12-month horizon and are therefore not reported. 
7 These data are available at http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/nagel/data/UK_FFFact.csv  
8 The Carhart (1997) four-factor version of the Fama-French model is often used in performance attribution for 
mutual funds. The fourth factor, known as UMD (“up-minus-down”) is a measure of the return to momentum 
portfolios. The key distinction between this approach and what we propose here is that we are trying to explain 
the profitability of momentum portfolios using a previously unexamined measure of risk, whereas the UMD term 
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 Embedded in equations (1) and (2) is the assumption that ( )2,0~ σε Nt  and, thus, that there 
is no conditional volatility in the market. Since Engle (1982), numerous studies have been 
written on the family of GARCH models (Poon and Granger, 2003; Andersen et al., 2006; 
Bauwens et al., 2006). The attractiveness of the GARCH models stems from the fact that they 
model the conditional variance of asset returns by taking into account persistence in volatility 
(where volatility shocks today influence expected volatility many months from now) and 
“leverage effects” (where negative return shocks impact volatility more than positive return 
shocks of the same magnitude). These two features are central to our hypotheses that the 
losers’ volatilities show more persistence and asymmetry than those of the winners. 
 
We investigate whether momentum profits in the UK are a compensation for time-varying 
risk within GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M versions of the market and Fama and French models: 
( )
2
1
2
11
2
1
2
−−−− +++=
++−+=
ttttt
ttftMtt
I
RRR
θσεηγεωσ
εδσβα
      (3) 
( )
2
1
2
11
2
1
2
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++++−+=
ttttt
ttttftMtt
I
hHMLsSMBRRR
θσεηγεωσ
εδσβα
    (4) 
where 2tσ  is the conditional variance of the winner, loser and momentum portfolios, δσt 
measures the time-varying risk premium, γ. η relates to the lagged squared error term and 
measures the impact of recent news on volatility, η also measures any asymmetric response of 
volatility to bad and good news (commonly attributed to as leverage effect), 11 =−tI  if 
01 <−tε  (bad news, also called negative return shock) and 01 =−tI  otherwise, θ relates to the 
lagged conditional volatility and measures the impact of old news on volatility.  
 
Within the framework of systems (3) and (4), the following two hypotheses can be tested. 
First, the coefficients on conditional volatility indicate how news impacts the volatility of the 
winners and of the losers. In particular, we analyze the speed of the response of the winners 
and losers to news and test for the presence of any asymmetry in the response of the winners’ 
and losers’ volatilities to good and bad news. Second, the sign and significance of α in the 
mean equations of systems (3) and (4) indicate whether the momentum returns are a 
uses momentum to explain the returns from other strategies. Thus, in our study, momentum is the explained 
variable whereas in the Carhart model, it is an explanatory variable. 
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compensation for market risk, the risks associated with size and book-to-market value and 
time-varying, unsystematic risk.  
 
We also test whether the momentum profits can be explained by a simplified version of the 
above models in the standard GARCH(1,1)-M framework. This specification models the 
time-varying risk premium as in (3) and (4) but does not allow for asymmetric response of 
volatility to good and bad news. Practically, this breaks down to estimating the following 
systems of equations 
( )
2
1
2
1
2
−− ++=
++−+=
ttt
ttftMtt RRR
θσγεωσ
εδσβα
      (5) 
( )
2
1
2
1
2
−− ++=
++++−+=
ttt
ttttftMtt hHMLsSMBRRR
θσγεωσ
εδσβα
    (6) 
 
3. Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. The rows 
represent the ranking periods (J = 3, 6 and 12 months) and the columns represent the holding 
periods (K = 3, 6 and 12 months). It is clear from this table that the winners systematically 
outperform the losers at the 1% level. Across strategies, the momentum portfolios earn an 
average return of 0.0151 a month, with a range from 0.0093 for the 3-3 strategy to 0.0193 for 
the 6-6 strategy.9 These results corroborate those of Liu et al. (1999) and Ellis and Thomas 
(2003) for the UK.  
 
Table 1 also reports the monthly standard deviations and reward-to-risk ratios of each 
portfolio returns. Consistent with rational expectations, the momentum portfolios with higher 
returns have also more risk. For instance, the 6-6 strategy earns the highest average return 
(0.0193) and, with a standard deviation of 0.0511, it is also the second most volatile strategy. 
With a reward-to-risk ratio of 0.3856, the 12-6 strategy generates the highest average return in 
risk-adjusted terms, while the 3-3 strategy offers the lowest risk-adjusted return (0.1925).  
 
The contribution of the article is with regards to the time-varying unsystematic risk of the 
winner and loser portfolios and the impact that it may have on momentum profits. With this in 
9 Note that all figures in this study refer to monthly proportion returns rather than percentage returns, unless 
otherwise stated.  
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mind, we first analyze the performance of the winner, loser and momentum portfolios within 
the standard market and Fama and French models and then allow for time-varying 
unsystematic risk through different specifications of the GARCH(1,1) model. While doing 
this, we will also analyze the impact of recent news, old news and bad news on the volatility 
of the winners and losers. 
 
3. 1. Static market and Fama and French models 
Table 2 reports the OLS estimates of the market and Fama and French models (1) and (2) for 
the winner, loser and momentum portfolios.10 In line with previous research (Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993; Fama and French, 1996; Karolyi and Kho, 2004), the results indicate that 
traditional versions of the market and Fama and French models fail to explain momentum 
profits. Regardless of the model, of the ranking period, and of the holding period, the α 
coefficients of the momentum strategies in equations (1) and (2) are positive and significant at 
the 1% level. The momentum profits estimated from the market model range from 0.0095 (3-
3 strategy) to 0.0194 (6-6 strategy), with an average return at 0.0151 a month. According to 
the Fama and French model, the winners outperform the losers by 0.0177 on average, with a 
range of 0.0110 (3-3 strategy) to 0.0222 (12-6 strategy).  
 
While systematic risk explains most of the over-performance of the winners, it fails to 
account for the under-performance of the losers. Irrespective of the ranking period, of the 
holding period and of the risk model considered, the losers indeed have negative alphas that 
are significant at the 1% level. As in Hong et al. (2000), the momentum profits are therefore 
driven by the losers. 
 
The factor loadings on RMt, SMBt and HMLt in (1) and (2) suggest that the winner and loser 
portfolios tend to pick small capitalization stocks (s>0) with high market risk (β>0). The 
winners have growth characteristics (h<0) and the losers have value characteristics (h>0). The 
momentum strategies are predominantly market-neutral (β=0) and size-neutral (s=0) and have 
negative loadings on HMLt. These results are consistent with those previously reported, 
including the studies by Chan et al. (1996) and Liu et al. (1999). 
 
10 Engle (1982)’s ARCH-LM test provides strong evidence of heteroscedasticity in the OLS residuals of the 
market and Fama-French models. Hence, we use White’s heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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3. 2. GARCH(1,1) versions of market and Fama and French models  
Table 3 reports estimates of the market and Fama and French models (3) and (4) that include 
a GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M term. To facilitate exposition, the averages across ranking and 
holding periods of the coefficient estimates are discussed in the following section for the 
winner, loser and momentum portfolios, but are not reported directly in the Table due to space 
constraints. The estimation method is Maximum Likelihood with Bollerslev-Wooldridge 
robust standard errors. We first analyze how news, whether it is recent, distant or negative, 
impacts the volatility of the winners and the losers. We subsequently test for whether the 
time-varying unsystematic risk common to the winners and losers explains the profitability of 
the momentum strategies. 
 
The pattern of conditional volatility 
The coefficients γ and η in systems (3) and (4) relate to the lagged squared error term and, 
therefore, to the impact of recent news on volatility. The average γ+η/2 of the conditional 
market model equals 0.2554 for the winners and 0.1262 for the losers.11 The average γ+η/2 of 
the conditional Fama and French model is 0.2867 for the winners and 0.1551 for the losers. 
Clearly, recent news impacts the volatility of the winners more than it impacts that of the 
losers. With only one exception (the 3-3 winner in the Fama and French model), the 
conclusion holds throughout in Table 3, irrespective of the ranking period, of the holding 
period and of the model considered. 
 
The coefficient θ in systems (3) and (4) reflects the effect of lagged conditional variance and 
captures the impact of “old news” on volatility. The results of the conditional market model in 
Table 4 indicate that the average θ coefficient of the winners (0.5785) is lower than that of the 
losers (0.7911). The same conclusion applies to the conditional Fama and French model, for 
which the winners have an average θ coefficient of 0.5017 and the losers an average θ 
coefficient of 0.8072. It is clear therefore that “old news” has more impact on the volatility of 
the losers than on the volatility of the winners. Looking at the estimates of θ in Table 3, it 
appears that the conclusion holds for the vast majority of the portfolios, the 12-12 winner in 
the market model being the only exception.  
 
11 While the parameters in the conditional variance equation of a symmetric GARCH model are usually required 
to be positive, when the GJR form of the model is used, it is possible for the parameter on the asymmetry term 
(η in our notation) to be negative. More specifically, if E(It) = ½, then provided that γ > η/2, the negative 
parameter would not lead the conditional variance to be negative. We have checked this condition and it is 
satisfied for all models estimated in this study. 
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The asymmetric coefficients (η) in Table 3 suggest that bad news has different impacts on the 
volatility of the winners and on the volatility of the losers. For the losers, the mean of the η 
coefficients is 0.3028 for the conditional market model and 0.2203 for the conditional Fama 
and French model. With only a few exceptions, these coefficients are significant at the 5% 
level in Table 3. Clearly, therefore, bad news increases the volatility of the losers. For the 
winner portfolios, however, the average η coefficient equals -0.1852 for the conditional 
market model and 0.0949 for the conditional Fama and French model, with 14 out of 18 
coefficients that are insignificant at the 5% level in Table 3. It follows that the announcement 
of bad news does not have any noticeable impact on the volatility of the winners. It may be 
the case that stocks whose recent performance has already been poor are hit much harder by 
further bad news than stocks recently performing well, which are able to absorb bad news 
more easily.  
 
The evidence of Table 3 thus far indicates that, with relatively few exceptions, the losers have 
higher η and θ, and lower γ, than the winners. Table 3 also reports the persistence in volatility 
of the winners and losers, measured as γ+η/2+θ. The volatility of the losers appears to be 
more persistent than that of the winners. Indeed, the average γ+η/2+θ of the losers (winners) 
equals 0.9172 (0.8339) for the conditional market model and 0.9623 (0.7885) for the 
conditional Fama and French model. For the conditional market model, this converts into 
volatility half-lives of 3 months and 18 days for the winners and 8 months for the losers. The 
volatility half-lives estimated from the conditional Fama and French model equal 2 months 
and 20 days for the winners and 18 months for the losers. Clearly and with only one exception 
out of 18 regressions,12 the volatility persistence of the losers exceeds that of the winners.  
 
The impact of time-varying firm specific risk on momentum profits 
Table 3 also reports, through δ, the impact of conditional volatility on the returns of the 
winners, losers and momentum portfolios. An increase in conditional volatility decreases the 
return of both the winners and the losers, but increases the momentum returns. The δ 
coefficients of the momentum portfolios from the conditional market model range from 
0.2718 (12-6 strategy) to 0.7616 (6-3 strategy) (Table 3) with an average at 0.4340. 6 (9) 
coefficients out of 9 are significant at the 5% (10%) level. Similar results are reported for the 
conditional Fama and French model, for which δ equals 0.4368 on average, with 6 (8) 
coefficients out of 9 that are significant and positive at the 5% (10%) level. This suggests that 
12 The exception is for the 12-12 winner in the conditional market model (Table 3). 
 9 
                                                 
there is a positive relationship between time-varying risk and momentum return: A 1% 
increase in conditional volatility leads, on average, to a 0.43% increase in monthly 
momentum returns.  
 
The factor loadings on RMt, SMBt and HMLt for the conditional volatility model in Table 3 
indicate that the winners and the losers have value characteristics (h>0) and are tilted towards 
small-capitalization stocks (s>0) with high market risk (β>0). The latter two characteristics 
appear to corroborate the evidence from the unconditional Fama and French model (Table 2). 
As the loadings of the losers on RMt, SMBt and HMLt are typically higher than those of the 
winners, the momentum portfolios have coefficients on the three Fama and French factors that 
are predominantly negative.  
 
The main contribution of this paper is to test whether the momentum profits are a 
compensation for time-varying unsystematic risk as described by the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M 
model. If this is indeed the case, then the α coefficients of the momentum strategies should be 
statistically indistinguishable from zero when these terms are incorporated into the risk 
attribution model. This conjecture is supported uniformly at the 5% level for both the 
conditional market and Fama and French models. The GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M market model is 
able to explain the momentum returns, since the alpha estimates are reduced both in 
magnitude and in statistical significance. The alphas indeed range from -0.0103 (12-3 strategy) 
to 0.0093 (12-6 strategy), with a mean at -0.0016. The GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M Fama and 
French model does a good job of explaining the momentum profits too, with an average alpha 
of 0.0004 and a range of -0.0085 (12-3 strategy) to 0.0093 (6-6 strategy). Clearly, the results 
of Tables 2 and 3 suggest that adding a GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M structure to the models 
traditionally used to measure performance is crucial to explaining the abnormal return of 
momentum strategies. Interestingly, the considerable reduction in relative price strength 
returns after allowing for time-varying risk seems to stem from an increase in the performance 
of the loser portfolios. This suggests that the underperformance of the losers identified in 
Table 2 is in part due to their sluggish and asymmetric reaction to bad news.  
 
Analysis of results 
Proponents of the efficient markets hypothesis could argue that our results are an indication of 
momentum profits being merely a compensation for unsystematic risks common to the 
winners and losers but stronger for the former than the latter. This line of thought would 
therefore conclude that our findings are consistent with rational pricing in efficient markets. 
 10 
Thus, future research could seek to determine why unsystematic risk is important. It may be 
the case, for example, that the time-varying risks are related to industry effects, where certain 
industries that may be over-represented in the momentum portfolios become relatively more 
or less risky in a cyclical fashion over time as they go into and out of investment favour.  
 
However, our results are also consistent with a behavioural explanation along the lines of 
Hong, Lim and Stein (2000), where information on the loser stocks takes longer to be fully 
reflected in prices. The strong impact of old news identified for the losers and the persistence 
in their volatility are in support of the statement of Hong et al. that “bad news travels slowly”. 
When a firm with no or low analyst coverage receives bad news, its managers are likely to 
withhold that news as disclosing it would put downward pressure on price. Since losers are 
more likely than winners to sit on bad news, they are also more likely to withhold information. 
For the losers, this converts into higher volatility persistence (or higher volatility half-lives) 
and higher sensitivity of volatility to distant news. The results in Table 3 also give credence to 
the conjecture that, for winners, good news travels fast. Managers of no or low coverage firms 
have strong incentives to disclose good news the minute it arrives as this stimulates the share 
price. Since winners are, by definition, more likely than losers to receive good news, they are 
more eager to disclose information. This converts in our setting into a higher sensitivity of 
winners’ volatility to recent news and less volatility persistence (or lower volatility half-lives). 
 
We identify another interesting pattern in the volatility of the winner and losers. Relative to 
the volatility of the winners, the volatility of the losers clearly shows an asymmetric response 
to good and bad news: bad news substantially increases the volatility of the losers, while it 
does not impact that of the winners. This is in line with the prediction of the behavioural 
argument put forward above. Since, relative to winners, losers have a higher probability of 
disclosing bad news, negative return shocks increase their volatility more than they increase 
that of the winners. The asymmetric response of losers to negative returns shocks could be 
explained as follows. Relative to winners, the probability that losers disclose bad news is far 
greater. Thus the announcement of a bad piece of news does not alter the volatility of winners 
(as bad news is expected to be transitory only) while it pushes up that of losers. When losers 
do disclose bad news, investors interpret this as a sign that their beliefs were correct, leading 
them to sell the losers. As a result, their volatility increases and becomes more persistent. 
 
A failure to explicitly model the asymmetric response of the losers and winners to bad news 
might therefore lead us to under-estimate the volatility of the losers, and consequently their 
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performance, following a price drop or to over-estimate the volatility of the winners, and 
consequently their performance, following a price rise. This motivates the hypothesis that the 
momentum profits might, at least in part, be a compensation for an asymmetric response of 
winners and losers to negative return shocks.  
 
Robustness of the results to the specification of the GARCH(1,1) model 
In this section, we test whether the momentum profits can be explained by a simplified 
version of the conditional models. Table 4 reports the parameter estimates of systems (5) and 
(6) for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. Table 4 therefore assumes that the return 
and conditional volatility of the momentum portfolios are better described by a GARCH(1,1)-
M model.13 
 
The omission of the leverage effect in Table 4 does not alter the main conclusions of Table 3 
with regards to the pattern of volatility for the winners and the losers. For example, Table 3 
and 4 document that the volatility of the winners (W) is more sensitive to recent news than the 
volatility of the losers (L); namely, LW γγ > . Similarly, the impact of old news on volatility in 
Tables 3 and 4 is stronger for the losers; namely, WL θθ > . Finally, volatility in both tables is 
found to be more persistent for the losers; namely, >++ LLL θηγ 2  WWW θηγ ++ 2  in 
Table 3 and >+ LL θγ  WW θγ +  in Table 4.
 14 As a result, the average volatility half-lives are 
much smaller for the winners than for the losers. Across GARCH specifications, ranking 
periods, and holding periods, the volatility half-life of the winners is 3 months and 5 days on 
average, while that of the losers is 24 months and 13 days. 
 
The omission of the leverage effect however has a direct impact on the significance of the 
time-varying risk parameter δ in Table 4. Out of the 18 δ coefficients estimated for the 
momentum strategies in Table 3, 17 were significant at the 10% level. When, as in Table 4, 
the impact of news on volatility is assumed to be symmetric, the number of significant δ 
coefficients drops to 3. As a result, the market and Fama and French models with 
GARCH(1,1)-M terms are less able to explain the momentum profits. Though largely 
insignificant in Table 4, the average abnormal returns of the momentum strategies equal 
13 We also examined a pure GJR-GARCH(1,1) – that is, a model without a conditional volatility term in the 
mean equation. However, unsurprisingly, it did not explain the observed momentum profits since in such a 
model, there is no linkage between the time-varying volatility and the returns. Therefore, the estimates from this 
model are not included in the paper, but are available from the authors on request.   
14 Again there are a few exceptions ( WL γγ >  for the 3-3 and 3-12 winners of the conditional Fama and French 
model), but these are extremely rare. 
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0.0125 a month for the GARCH(1,1)-M market model and 0.0079 for the GARCH(1,1)-M 
Fama and French model. These average α coefficients are in excess of the -0.0016 and 0.0004 
average abnormal return for the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M market model and the GJR-
GARCH(1,1)-M Fama and French model, respectively.  
 
To summarize, the evidence in Tables 3 and 4 suggests that it is both the asymmetric response 
of the losers to good and bad news and the conditional risk premium that explain the 
profitability of the momentum strategies. Neither the leverage effect, nor the conditional risk 
premium in isolation can explain the abnormal performance of the momentum strategies. It is 
the interaction between two that drives the momentum returns.  
 
To judge the relative merits of models (1) to (6), the Akaike information criterion (AIC) is 
calculated for the winners, losers and momentum portfolios. AIC trades off better model fit 
for greater numbers of parameters, and thus a preferred model is one with the lowest value of 
the criterion. The results are reported in Table 5 for different specifications of the market and 
Fama and French models. These specifications include the static models (1) and (2), the GJR-
GARCH(1,1)-M models (3) and (4), and the GARCH(1,1)-M models (5) and (6). 
 
For a given specification of the risk-return relationship, the data always favor the Fama and 
French model over the market model. This indicates that the size and book-to-market value 
risk factors add explanatory power to the models over and above that provided by the market 
return. More pertinent to our study, the data evidently prefer the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M models 
to the static approaches. The GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M market and Fama and French models have 
the lowest AIC in the vast majority of the cases, and never rank last in terms of AIC. These 
results for the GJR-GARCH (1,1)-M models compare favorably to the AIC of the 
GARCH(1,1)-M. Irrespective of the ranking and holding periods, the static versions of the 
market and Fama and French model stand out as having the highest values of the AIC. This 
suggests that out of the three specifications of the market and Fama and French models, the 
static versions provide the worst account of the returns of the winner, loser and momentum 
portfolios, while the time-varying conditional volatility models allowing for asymmetries 
provide the best.  
 
Robustness of the results to the market examined 
In order to determine whether the ability of the asymmetric conditional volatility model to 
explain the results of the momentum portfolios results from some specific feature of the UK 
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market, or whether it is likely to be more general, we repeat the entire analysis above on 
winner, loser and  momentum portfolios formed from US stocks. The US data cover the 
period January 1978 to December 2001, and were obtained from Datastream. The mean 
returns of the winner, loser, and momentum portfolios, formed in an identical way to that 
described above for the UK market, are presented in Table 6. There is ample evidence of 
momentum effects, with the winner portfolio average returns statistically significantly 
exceeding those of the losers for all nine portfolio formation and holding periods examined. 
While the sizes of the momentum effects are slightly smaller for the US, they are of the same 
order of magnitude as they were for the UK. For example, for the (12, 12) horizon, the 
average monthly return for the UK was 1.43%, and for the US it is 1.12%. For the latter 
market, profitability is highest at 1.71% per month for the (12, 3) strategy, whereas it was 
maximized at 1.93% for the (6, 6) strategy in the UK.  
 
Table 7 reports the parameter estimates for the statistic market and Fama-French models 
using the US data. It is evident that the 3-factor model is no more able to explain the 
profitability of relative strength portfolios for this market than it was for the UK. For all nine 
(eight of the nine) combinations of portfolio formation and holding periods examined, the 
momentum profits are still positive and statistically significant at the 5% (1%) level.  
 
Finally, Table 8 shows the parameters for the conditional market and Fama and French 
models with a GJR-GARCH (1, 1)-M term estimated using US Data. While the importance of 
time-varying unsystematic risk appears more uniformly high whatever combination of 
portfolio formation and holding period are used in the UK context than for the US, in the 
latter case, the momentum profits are again largely explained by the incorporation of the 
unsystematic risk terms into the equations. This leads both the sizes of the estimated alphas 
and their levels of statistical significance to reduce. For instance, when the time-varying 
unsystematic risk terms are included in the model, the alpha for the (6,6) momentum strategy 
of 0.0134 when the market model is used is reduced by 40% to 0.085 and it is reduced by 
25% to 0.012 when the Fama-French model is used. For the augmented market models 
presented, only one, the (6,12) strategy, is significantly profitable at the 5% level, and none 
are profitable at the 1% level; similarly, only one combination of formation and holding 
periods leads to significant alpha when the Fama-French model is augmented by the inclusion 
of the conditional unsystematic risk term.15 Our other major findings concerning the speed of 
15 Again, similar results are found, but not reported here, for the symmetric GARCH-M formulation. 
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adjustment of volatility and the asymmetric response of volatility to good and bad news for 
the winners relative to the losers still holds.  
4. Conclusions 
This article considers whether the widely documented momentum profits are a compensation 
for time-varying unsystematic risk as described by the family of autoregressive conditionally 
heteroscedastic models. The motivation for estimating a GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M model stems 
from the fact that since losers have a higher probability than winners to disclose bad news, 
one cannot assume a symmetric response of volatility to good and bad news. Neither can we 
presuppose that the speed of adjustment of volatility to news is the same for the winners and 
the losers. Such a suggestion is consistent with the findings of Hong et al. (2000) that for 
firms with no or low analysts coverage, bad news travels slower than good news and thus, the 
volatility of the losers may respond more slowly to news than that of the winners. Our results 
suggest that the time-varying unsystematic volatility of the winners indeed differs from that of 
the losers. For example, the volatility of the winners is found to be more sensitive to recent 
news and less persistent than that of the losers. The converse, that the volatility of the losers is 
found to be more sensitive to distant news and more persistent than that of the winners, also 
holds. Future research may ascertain the precise cause of these findings, and in particular 
whether they are best attributed to rational, risk-based or behavioral causes. But we conjecture 
that the time-varying risk of companies with no or low analyst coverage depends on the 
nature of the information that is been disclosed: Good news is disclosed earlier, and impacts 
volatility sooner, than bad news. Relative to the volatility of the winners, that of the losers 
also clearly shows a more asymmetric response to good and bad news. As losers have a 
higher propensity to disclose bad news, negative return shocks increase their volatility more 
than they increase that of winners. 
 
Most importantly, we also document that the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M models explain much of 
the profitability of the momentum strategies, and certainly have more descriptive power than 
the commonly used size and value risk factors. Interestingly, neither the GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
nor the GARCH(1,1)-M specifications alone could account for the abnormal return of the 
relative-strength portfolios. It is therefore a combination of the asymmetric response of the 
losers to good and bad news, the sluggish response of losers to bad news and the conditional 
risk premium embedded in the GARCH(1,1)-M model, that explain the profitability of the 
relative-strength portfolios.  
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Table 1 – Summary statistics of the returns of the winner, loser and momentum portfolios 
 
Winner (Loser) is an equally-weighted non-overlapping portfolio containing the 10% of stocks that performed the best (worst) over a given 
ranking period. Momentum is a portfolio that buys the winner portfolio and sells the loser portfolio short. Returns are measured as 
proportions rather than percentages. Reward-to-risk ratio is the ratio of the monthly mean to the monthly standard deviation. The p-values in 
parentheses are for the significance of the mean. They are based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust (Newey-West) standard 
errors. 
 
 
Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months
Mean 0.0063 -0.0030 0.0093 0.0084 -0.0055 0.0139 0.0077 -0.0048 0.0125
(0.02) (0.22) (0.04) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01)
Standard deviation 0.0555 0.0699 0.0485 0.0573 0.0689 0.0506 0.0608 0.0639 0.0474
Reward-to-risk ratio 0.1137 -0.0433 0.1925 0.1468 -0.0792 0.2740 0.1265 -0.0751 0.2634
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months
Mean 0.0107 -0.0064 0.0171 0.0113 -0.0080 0.0193 0.0085 -0.0053 0.0139
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00)
Standard deviation 0.0554 0.0707 0.0535 0.0562 0.0682 0.0511 0.0578 0.0654 0.0497
Reward-to-risk ratio 0.1933 -0.0911 0.3203 0.2006 -0.1170 0.3769 0.1478 -0.0815 0.2792
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months
Mean 0.0121 -0.0041 0.0162 0.0128 -0.0063 0.0191 0.0098 -0.0045 0.0143
(0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00)
Standard deviation 0.0571 0.0638 0.0501 0.0571 0.0653 0.0496 0.0568 0.0635 0.0456
Reward-to-risk ratio 0.2121 -0.0645 0.3242 0.2243 -0.0966 0.3856 0.1728 -0.0704 0.3133
Holding period of 3 months Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
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Table 2 – Static market and Fama and French models 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates for equations (1) and (2) for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. Winner (Loser) is an 
equally-weighted non-overlapping portfolio containing the 10% of stocks that performed the best (worst) over a given ranking period. 
Momentum is a portfolio that buys the winner portfolio and short sells the loser portfolio. α measures the portfolio’s abnormal performance, 
β measures the market risk of the portfolio, s and h are the portfolio loadings on the size and book-to-market value factors as measured by 
Fama and French (1993). MM refers to the market model and FFM refers to the Fama and French model. White’s heteroscedasticity robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. 
 
 
MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months
α -0.0020 -0.0031 -0.0115 -0.0141 0.0095 0.0110 0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0139 -0.0170 0.0140 0.0161 -0.0007 -0.0014 -0.0132 -0.0166 0.0125 0.0152
(-0.87) (-2.33) (-3.81) (-6.24) (3.46) (4.11 ) (0.03) (-0.71) (-4.59) (-7.80) (4.82) (6.05 ) (-0.28) (-1.01) (-4.68) (-8.49) (4.60) (6.47 )
β 0.7662 0.9660 0.9155 1.1528 -0.1493 -0.1868 0.7833 0.9856 0.8858 1.1360 -0.1025 -0.1505 0.8358 1.0392 0.8237 1.0707 0.0121 -0.0314
(11.79) (26.08 ) (12.15) (13.64 ) (-1.62) (-1.73) (11.35) (22.83 ) (12.06) (13.77 ) (-1.11) (-1.39) (16.03) (29.46 ) (12.24) (17.58 ) (0.23) (-0.49)
s ― 1.0001 ― 1.1143 ― -0.1142 ― 1.0195 ― 1.1563 ― -0.1368 ― 1.0439 ― 1.1184 ― -0.0745
(17.45 ) (11.98 ) (-0.89) (16.45 ) (12.72 ) (-1.05) (17.23 ) (14.98 ) (-0.69)
h ― -0.1160 ― 0.2598 ― -0.3759 ― -0.1529 ― 0.3770 ― -0.5300 ― -0.2563 ― 0.4934 ― -0.7497
(-1.43) (1.69 ) (-2.05) (-1.58) (2.23 ) (-2.36) (-2.10) (4.32 ) (-4.04)
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months
α 0.0024 0.0017 -0.0149 -0.0182 0.0173 0.0200 0.0029 0.0021 -0.0164 -0.0198 0.0194 0.0219 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0138 -0.0173 0.0139 0.0169
(1.05) (1.34 ) (-4.78) (-7.89) (5.67) (7.03 ) (1.28) (1.75 ) (-5.42) (-9.03) (6.60) (8.13 ) (0.07) (-0.39) (-4.77) (-8.32) (4.89) (6.64 )
β 0.7751 0.9601 0.9017 1.1525 -0.1266 -0.1924 0.7936 0.9846 0.8677 1.1181 -0.0742 -0.1334 0.8188 1.0099 0.8451 1.0899 -0.0263 -0.0800
(11.28) (22.13 ) (11.78) (13.31 ) (-1.29) (-1.64) (11.87) (22.39 ) (11.77) (13.77 ) (-0.80) (-1.21) (15.39) (31.08 ) (12.09) (15.50 ) (-0.39) (-0.94)
s ― 0.9475 ― 1.1450 ― -0.1975 ― 0.9716 ― 1.1375 ― -0.1659 ― 0.9807 ― 1.0960 ― -0.1153
(16.84 ) (12.04 ) (-1.49) (17.19 ) (12.87 ) (-1.31) (17.65 ) (13.59 ) (-0.99)
h ― -0.2210 ― 0.4528 ― -0.6738 ― -0.1910 ― 0.4799 ― -0.6709 ― -0.2395 ― 0.5575 ― -0.7971
(-2.47) (2.57 ) (-2.89) (-2.26) (2.79 ) (-3.03) (-2.21) (4.27 ) (-3.92)
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months
α 0.0037 0.0033 -0.0125 -0.0155 0.0162 0.0188 0.0044 0.0039 -0.0147 -0.0183 0.0191 0.0222 0.0014 0.0008 -0.0129 -0.0165 0.0142 0.0174
(1.69) (2.68 ) (-4.46) (-7.06) (5.63) (7.02 ) (2.00) (3.32 ) (-5.01) (-8.66) (6.68) (8.69 ) (0.64) (0.76 ) (-4.59) (-8.53) (5.48) (7.73 )
β 0.8525 1.0210 0.8270 1.0435 0.0255 -0.0225 0.8480 1.0232 0.8214 1.0707 0.0265 -0.0475 0.8468 1.0259 0.8164 1.0599 0.0304 -0.0340
(13.71) (24.79 ) (10.89) (11.54 ) (0.27) (-0.19) (13.62) (24.14 ) (10.48) (11.58 ) (0.27) (-0.40) (16.15) (35.74 ) (12.47) (16.48 ) (0.51) (-0.46)
s ― 0.8763 ― 0.9803 ― -0.1040 ― 0.9036 ― 1.1168 ― -0.2132 ― 0.9200 ― 1.0835 ― -0.1635
(16.97 ) (10.73 ) (-0.84) (17.08 ) (12.35 ) (-1.73) (18.87 ) (14.96 ) (-1.71)
h ― -0.2726 ― 0.4346 ― -0.7072 ― -0.2434 ― 0.5625 ― -0.8059 ― -0.2283 ― 0.5925 ― -0.8208
(-2.97) (3.35 ) (-4.07) (-2.57) (4.56 ) (-4.71) (-2.43) (5.13 ) (-4.91)
Holding period of 3 months Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum
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Table 3 – Conditional market and Fama and French models with a GJR-GARCH (1, 1)-M term 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates for systems (3) and (4) for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. Winner (Loser) is an equally-
weighted non-overlapping portfolio containing the 10% of stocks that performed the best (worst) over a given ranking period. Momentum is 
a portfolio that buys the winner portfolio and short sells the loser portfolio. α measures the portfolio’s abnormal performance, β measures the 
market risk of the portfolio, s and h are the portfolio loadings on the size and book-to-market value factors as measured by Fama and French 
(1993), tδσ  is the time-varying risk exposure. The conditional variance of the portfolio returns follows a GJR-GARCH(1,1) structure as 
2
1
2
11
2
1
2
−−−− +++= ttttt I θσεηγεωσ , where ω, γ, η and  θ are estimated parameters and It-1 takes a value of 1, when εt-1 is negative and a value 
of 0, otherwise. MM refers to the market model and FFM refers to the Fama and French model. Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust t-statistics are 
in parentheses.  
 
 
 
MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months
α -0.0015 0.0164 -0.0090 0.0106 -0.0028 -0.0007 0.0094 0.0073 0.0501 0.0084 -0.0013 0.0027 0.0016 0.0215 0.0514 0.0178 0.0011 0.0024
(-0.17) (2.48) (-1.41) (1.67) (-0.44) (-0.10) (1.55) (2.15) (2.64) (1.74) (-0.19) (0.48 ) (0.27) (3.11) (10.02) (2.14) (0.21 ) (0.45 )
β 0.7049 0.9410 0.7786 1.0329 -0.0633 -0.1510 0.6659 0.8707 0.7589 1.0316 -0.0436 -0.1760 0.7367 1.0186 0.6933 0.9444 0.0664 0.0191
(14.87) (34.29) (15.71) (15.89) (-1.67) (-3.61) (22.31) (28.14) (19.30) (21.94) (-0.90) (-4.22) (24.08) (27.37) (45.65) (38.61) (2.19 ) (0.61 )
s ― 0.8956 ― 1.0740 ― -0.2388 ― 0.8066 ― 1.1024 ― -0.3119 0.9423 1.0383 ― -0.1345
(21.85) (18.48) (-3.56) (21.36) (22.51) (-4.91) (25.19) (23.53) (-2.38)
h ― 0.0682 ― 0.3588 ― -0.2807 ― 0.1173 ― 0.4939 ― -0.4083 0.1296 0.4544 ― -0.2687
(1.07) (4.43) (-3.23) (2.42) (6.92) (-4.34) (2.10) (8.39) (-3.87)
δ -0.0232 -0.9622 -0.0102 -0.6502 0.3038 0.2897 -0.2304 -0.3971 -1.3282 -0.7437 0.3280 0.3141 -0.0387 -1.1028 -1.3747 -1.1255 0.3497 0.3437
(-0.08) (-2.66) (-0.07) (-3.31) (1.65 ) (1.49 ) (-1.11) (-2.05) (-3.34) (-4.33) (1.63 ) (1.78 ) (-0.20) (-3.17) (-7.91) (-3.39) (2.09 ) (1.91 )
ω 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(2.90) (2.42) (1.12) (1.45) (1.63 ) (1.42 ) (3.02) (3.48) (1.69) (1.48) (1.64 ) (1.51 ) (2.00) (1.58) (-0.12) (2.27) (1.48 ) (1.42 )
γ 0.3542 0.1560 0.1181 0.1048 0.5210 0.4146 0.4488 0.4621 -0.0353 0.0822 0.4492 0.4765 0.3051 0.2451 -0.0062 -0.0193 0.3628 0.2953
(3.09) (2.49) (1.73) (1.24) (2.75 ) (2.56 ) (2.52) (2.65) (-2.63) (1.32) (3.45 ) (3.97 ) (2.72) (2.15) (-0.53) (-0.56) (2.89 ) (2.94 )
η -0.2856 0.0013 0.0789 0.1789 -0.4254 -0.3469 -0.0749 -0.1226 0.2155 0.2714 -0.2984 -0.3134 -0.0899 -0.1568 0.4319 0.3321 -0.2407 -0.1710
(-2.15) (0.02) (1.11) (2.06) (-2.41) (-2.26) (-0.41) (-0.42) (3.24) (2.63) (-2.46) (-2.60) (-0.83) (-1.31) (6.97) (3.12) (-2.23) (-1.88)
θ 0.5871 0.7288 0.8325 0.7560 0.6846 0.7443 0.4310 0.4042 0.8770 0.7762 0.6603 0.6657 0.6786 0.6443 0.7715 0.7870 0.7445 0.7709
(5.71) (10.06) (12.84) (7.88) (6.79 ) (7.84 ) (4.21) (3.18) (16.21) (12.95) (5.72 ) (7.39 ) (8.68) (4.02) (31.56) (11.98) (8.44 ) (10.03 )
γ +η /2+θ 0.7986 0.8854 0.9901 0.9502 0.9929 0.9854 0.8423 0.8050 0.9495 0.9942 0.9604 0.9855 0.9388 0.8110 0.9813 0.9338 0.9870 0.9806
Holding period of 3 months Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum
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Table 3 – Continued 
 
MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months
α 0.0238 0.0171 0.0665 0.0124 -0.0089 0.0011 0.0083 0.0120 0.0556 0.0077 0.0053 0.0093 0.0021 0.0147 0.0683 0.0116 -0.0014 -0.0044
(2.37 ) (2.95) (3.25) (2.05) (-1.44) (0.19 ) (1.29) (3.54) (4.21) (1.53) (0.98 ) (1.73 ) (0.34) (3.24) (2.86) (1.83) (-0.22) (-0.72)
β 0.7121 0.9063 0.7599 1.0016 -0.0088 -0.1286 0.6508 0.8930 0.7179 0.9755 -0.0357 -0.1303 0.6970 0.9290 0.6563 1.0114 0.0297 -0.0403
(18.76 ) (48.31) (17.51) (23.82) (-0.35) (-3.26) (23.41) (35.16) (15.53) (22.16) (-1.11) (-3.55) (24.31) (30.72) (10.99) (19.72) (0.89 ) (-1.03)
s ― 0.7554 ― 1.0790 ― -0.3684 ― 0.8613 ― 1.0353 ― -0.2423 0.8999 1.0516 ― -0.1348
(25.08) (18.44) (-6.06) (25.52) (19.26) (-4.04) (22.71) (18.81) (-2.27)
h ― 0.0351 ― 0.5217 ― -0.5132 ― -0.0762 ― 0.6217 ― -0.6183 -0.0099 0.5414 ― -0.4616
(0.88) (5.88) (-5.55) (-1.16) (7.07) (-7.92) (-0.14) (5.17) (-6.11)
δ -0.6727 -0.8283 -1.6774 -0.8451 0.7616 0.4445 -0.1124 -0.4970 -1.4994 -0.7812 0.3538 0.3369 -0.0118 -0.7783 -1.7612 -0.8700 0.4165 0.5464
(-2.11) (-2.55) (-3.66) (-4.37) (5.85 ) (2.56 ) (-0.51) (-2.43) (-4.74) (-4.48) (2.28 ) (2.02 ) (-0.06) (-2.95) (-3.32) (-3.96) (2.28 ) (3.02 )
ω 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(3.20 ) (3.40) (2.99) (1.38) (1.74 ) (2.06 ) (2.39) (3.29) (2.81) (1.29) (1.31 ) (1.53 ) (2.45) (1.76) (2.01) (1.71) (1.53 ) (1.37 )
γ 0.3669 0.2077 -0.0872 0.0337 0.6100 0.6568 0.5312 0.3356 -0.0775 0.0729 0.4646 0.4326 0.3751 0.2097 -0.0169 0.0894 0.2988 0.2407
(2.66 ) (1.91) (-8.10) (1.21) (6.11 ) (3.13 ) (2.16) (2.34) (-3.69) (1.49) (2.69 ) (2.61 ) (3.39) (1.96) (-0.70) (1.62) (2.20 ) (2.32 )
η -0.1478 0.2377 0.3757 0.2300 -0.5096 -0.6385 -0.3465 0.1933 0.3698 0.1661 -0.4266 -0.3755 -0.2771 0.2078 0.4085 0.1604 -0.2044 -0.1316
(-0.82) (1.26) (4.08) (3.20) (-5.38) (-3.13) (-1.55) (0.78) (3.17) (2.08) (-2.49) (-2.29) (-2.00) (1.01) (2.96 ) (1.65) (-1.67) (-1.37)
θ 0.4155 0.3368 0.7780 0.8498 0.6198 0.6158 0.4885 0.2825 0.8030 0.8409 0.7403 0.7534 0.6475 0.4660 0.7060 0.8029 0.7768 0.8062
(2.34 ) (2.46) (10.88) (19.40) (12.93 ) (5.97 ) (3.47) (2.32) (13.39) (18.17) (9.74) (9.26 ) (6.63 ) (2.41) (6.73) (11.64) (8.99 ) (11.49 )
γ +η /2+θ 0.7085 0.6634 0.8787 0.9985 0.9750 0.9533 0.8465 0.7147 0.9105 0.9969 0.9916 0.9983 0.8840 0.7795 0.8933 0.9725 0.9734 0.9811
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months
α 0.0086 0.0240 0.0683 0.0179 -0.0103 -0.0085 0.0172 0.0171 0.0452 0.0113 0.0093 0.0038 0.0011 0.0150 0.0548 0.0208 -0.0053 -0.0025
(1.35) (3.36) (3.21) (2.72) (-1.58) (-1.31) (2.21) (4.68) (2.29) (1.32 ) (1.52 ) (0.52 ) (0.18) (2.87) (2.52) (1.38) (-0.72) (-0.32)
β 0.7515 0.9605 0.6929 0.9120 0.1299 0.0736 0.7431 0.9438 0.6810 0.9959 0.0282 -0.0366 0.7285 0.9593 0.6872 0.9881 0.0902 -0.0151
(26.31) (31.43) (16.53) (18.75) (2.38 ) (1.32 ) (16.12) (34.33) (14.93) (29.14 ) (0.68 ) (-0.85) (26.61) (69.71) (14.87) (34.46) (2.68 ) (-0.43)
s 0.7941 ― 0.8258 ― -0.0873 ― 0.8290 ― 1.0513 ― -0.2256 0.8769 1.0448 ― -0.1735
(18.67) (15.29) (-1.19) (22.31) (19.40 ) (-3.64) (35.00) (20.56) (-3.12)
h -0.0816 ― 0.5744 ― -0.5398 ― -0.0317 ― 0.6272 ― -0.7148 0.0108 0.6901 ― -0.6555
(-0.95) (8.25) (-4.68) (-0.55) (9.70 ) (-9.42) (0.31) (11.33) (-8.74)
δ -0.1314 -1.0132 -1.8889 -0.9683 0.5879 0.6233 -0.3595 -0.6839 -1.2735 -0.8920 0.2718 0.4790 0.0539 -0.7640 -1.4360 -1.1617 0.5327 0.5535
(-0.56) (-3.14) (-3.56) (-4.45) (3.72 ) (3.23 ) (-1.43) (-3.58) (-2.99) (-3.10) (1.64 ) (2.36 ) (0.25) (-2.33) (-2.79) (-2.26) (2.64 ) (2.35 )
ω 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
(2.25) (2.42) (2.30) (1.58) (1.77 ) (1.15 ) (1.72) (2.44) (1.80) (1.43 ) (0.94 ) (1.22 ) (2.12) (3.79) (2.78) (2.29) (1.26 ) (1.90 )
γ 0.2372 0.2298 -0.0634 0.0150 0.4103 0.2702 0.2945 0.2168 -0.0269 -0.0081 0.3080 0.2646 0.2193 0.0907 -0.0318 0.0339 0.2863 0.2002
(2.57 ) (2.39) (-3.75) (0.41) (4.24) (4.00 ) (2.48) (1.78) (-1.88) (-0.31) (2.45 ) (2.60) (3.15 ) (1.51) (-1.53) (1.09) (2.33 ) (2.17 )
η -0.2343 -0.0053 0.3392 0.2111 -0.3914 -0.3132 -0.0585 0.2030 0.1757 0.2346 -0.2691 -0.1370 -0.1521 0.2957 0.3299 0.1980 -0.2352 -0.0478
(-1.89) (-0.04) (3.50) (2.92) (-3.06) (-2.58) (-0.39) (0.92) (2.12) (2.65 ) (-2.25) (-1.46) (-2.36) (2.43) (2.32) (2.42 ) (-2.03) (-0.53)
θ 0.7386 0.5574 0.7608 0.8732 0.7772 0.8642 0.5113 0.5054 0.9130 0.8770 0.7880 0.7816 0.7083 0.5904 0.6777 0.7013 0.8298 0.7385
(8.51 ) (3.74) (8.13) (21.44) (14.61 ) (23.23 ) (2.58) (3.66) (18.37) (16.64 ) (12.77 ) (10.95) (6.09 ) (9.69) (7.22) (7.30) (12.26 ) (8.86 )
γ +η /2+θ 0.8587 0.7845 0.8671 0.9937 0.9918 0.9778 0.7766 0.8238 0.9739 0.9862 0.9614 0.9777 0.8515 0.8290 0.8108 0.8343 0.9985 0.9148
Holding period of 3 months Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
Winner Loser Momentum Winner MomentumLoser Momentum Winner Loser
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Table 4 – Conditional market and Fama and French models with a GARCH (1, 1)-M term 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates for systems (5) and (6) for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. Winner (Loser) is an equally-
weighted non-overlapping portfolio containing the 10% of stocks that performed the best (worst) over a given ranking period. Momentum is 
a portfolio that buys the winner portfolio and short sells the loser portfolio.  α measures the portfolio’s abnormal performance, β measures 
the market risk, s and h are the portfolio loadings on the size and book-to-market value factors as measured by Fama and French (1993), tδσ   
is the time-varying risk exposure. The conditional variance of the portfolio returns follows a GARCH(1,1) structure as 
2
1
2
1
2
−− ++= ttt θσγεωσ , where ω, γ and  θ are parameters. MM refers to the market model and FFM refers to the Fama and French model. 
Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust t-statistics are in parentheses.  
 
 
MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months
α 0.0172 0.0163 -0.0150 0.0031 0.0109 0.0092 0.0130 0.0078 -0.0071 0.0032 0.0067 0.0067 0.0035 0.0153 -0.0071 0.0012 0.0077 0.0064
(1.75) (2.53) (-2.38) (0.60) (1.57) (1.25) (2.22) (2.05) (-1.05) (0.79) (1.09) (1.24) (0.58) (2.12) (-1.09) (0.24) (1.54) (1.14)
β 0.7171 0.9410 0.7700 1.0342 -0.0558 -0.1376 0.6950 0.8734 0.7387 1.0441 -0.0749 -0.1802 0.7355 0.9907 0.6657 0.9779 0.0668 0.0166
(16.67) (34.45) (15.46) (18.26) (-1.41) (-3.23) (18.43) (28.30) (15.22) (27.21) (-1.93) (-4.25) (24.39) (50.51) (13.54) (33.22) (2.07) (0.51)
s ― 0.8956 ― 1.0596 ― -0.2162 ― 0.8078 ― 1.0992 ― -0.2886 0.8964 ― 1.0494 ― -0.1385
(21.94) (17.66) (-3.27) (21.28) (24.30) (-4.85) (27.37) (22.95) (-2.51) 
h ― 0.0685 ― 0.3909 ― -0.3291 ― 0.1073 ― 0.5567 ― -0.5041 0.1340 ― 0.4895 ― -0.3182
(1.10) (4.60) (-3.86) (2.16) (7.56) (-6.07) (2.90) (9.58) (-4.59) 
δ -0.5803 -0.9597 0.1459 -0.3789 -0.0829 -0.0042 -0.3731 -0.4330 -0.0298 -0.4875 0.1000 0.1825 -0.1001 -0.7551 -0.0524 -0.4790 0.0989 0.1898
(-1.94) (-2.78) (1.01) (-2.28) (-0.43) (-0.02) (-2.06) (-2.04) (-0.20) (-3.31) (0.58) (1.10) (-0.52) (-2.12) (-0.34) (-2.32) (0.60) (1.02)
ω 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
(2.85) (2.56) (1.16) (1.39) (1.87) (1.66) (3.39) (3.78) (0.98) (1.42) (2.10) (1.89) (2.14) (2.76) (1.49) (1.47) (1.60) (1.48)
γ 0.2416 0.1568 0.1818 0.2060 0.2466 0.2103 0.3767 0.3992 0.1676 0.2590 0.2758 0.2870 0.2742 0.2050 0.2603 0.2237 0.2395 0.1949
(2.85) (2.96) (3.27) (3.22) (2.63) (2.59) (3.53) (2.45) (2.84) (3.66) (3.20) (3.16) (2.88) (2.36) (2.00) (3.85) (2.94) (3.09)
θ 0.4927 0.7286 0.8114 0.7609 0.7012 0.7349 0.4405 0.3723 0.8274 0.7265 0.7079 0.7033 0.6642 0.5263 0.7110 0.7642 0.7327 0.7772
(3.83) (11.22) (13.71) (9.48) (7.05) (7.85) (4.77) (3.36) (12.73) (10.47) (9.00) (8.05) (8.76) (5.09) (5.70) (13.63) (8.37) (10.42)
γ +θ 0.7342 0.8854 0.9932 0.9669 0.9478 0.9452 0.8172 0.7715 0.9950 0.9855 0.9837 0.9903 0.9384 0.7313 0.9713 0.9879 0.9722 0.9721
Holding period of 3 months Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum
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Table 4 – Continued 
 
 
MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months
α 0.0283 0.0150 -0.0150 0.0021 0.0213 0.0165 0.0190 0.0108 -0.0114 0.0057 0.0186 0.0181 0.0091 0.0138 -0.0128 0.0045 0.0081 -0.0003
(2.18) (2.91) (-2.37) (0.41) (3.61) (2.65) (2.52) (3.12) (-1.67) (1.15) (3.14) (3.13) (1.71) (3.31) (-1.81) (0.89) (1.40) (-0.05) 
β 0.7224 0.8992 0.7192 1.0109 -0.0117 -0.1313 0.6980 0.8930 0.7153 0.9828 -0.0419 -0.1289 0.7323 0.9255 0.7129 1.0051 0.0254 -0.0387
(18.86) (47.75) (14.72) (23.67) (-0.30) (-3.31) (16.12) (34.37) (14.33) (24.88) (-1.10) (-3.45) (18.46) (31.52) (16.18) (21.22) (0.77) (-1.00) 
s ― 0.7512 ― 1.0820 ― -0.3124 ― 0.8611 ― 1.0449 ― -0.2304 ― 0.9008 ― 1.0502 ― -0.1232
(24.65) (18.29) (-4.68) (27.49) (20.01) (-4.03) (23.45) (18.88) (-2.13) 
h ― 0.0432 ― 0.5991 ― -0.6037 ― -0.0709 ― 0.6771 ― -0.6706 ― 0.0039 ― 0.5533 ― -0.5045
(1.06) (6.33) (-7.10) (-1.07) (8.10) (-8.58) (0.06) (6.14) (-7.15) 
δ -0.8193 -0.7123 0.1034 -0.4411 -0.1711 -0.0009 -0.4831 -0.4164 0.0056 -0.6419 -0.0413 0.0528 -0.2518 -0.7034 0.0394 -0.5709 0.1384 0.4128
(-2.04) (-2.44) (0.76) (-2.64) (-1.10) (-0.01) (-2.08) (-2.01) (0.04) (-3.82) (-0.25) (0.31) (-1.49) (-2.91) (0.25) (-3.32) (0.84) (2.39)
ω 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
(2.72) (3.16) (1.41) (1.39) (1.87) (1.74) (2.62) (2.98) (1.01) (1.20) (1.99) (1.93) (2.37) (1.82) (1.27) (1.64) (1.69) (1.45)
γ 0.2899 0.3016 0.2145 0.1829 0.3538 0.2935 0.3046 0.4324 0.1681 0.1718 0.3023 0.2729 0.3081 0.3285 0.1907 0.1914 0.2142 0.1774
(2.07) (2.38) (3.52) (3.61) (2.74) (2.92) (2.72) (3.40) (3.27) (3.26) (2.68) (2.89) (3.14) (2.50) (2.39) (3.15) (2.59) (2.86)
θ 0.3836 0.4132 0.7716 0.7975 0.6171 0.6523 0.3984 0.2998 0.8216 0.8234 0.6607 0.6804 0.5673 0.4610 0.7868 0.7920 0.7440 0.7942
(2.32) (3.20) (12.04) (14.11) (5.13) (6.42) (2.91) (2.24) (12.87) (16.19) (6.32) (7.48) (5.07) (2.50) (8.92) (13.79) (8.35) (11.28)
γ +θ 0.6735 0.7148 0.9861 0.9803 0.9709 0.9458 0.7030 0.7322 0.9897 0.9952 0.9630 0.9533 0.8754 0.7895 0.9776 0.9834 0.9582 0.9716
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months
α 0.0188 0.0240 -0.0033 0.0097 0.0043 -0.0038 0.0194 0.0174 -0.0204 -0.0004 0.0258 0.0190 0.0081 0.0142 -0.0175 0.0022 0.0090 -0.0005
(2.48) (3.27) (-0.55) (1.21) (1.09) (-0.55) (2.47) (4.56) (-2.58) (-0.09) (4.01) (3.31) (1.27) (3.62) (-1.97) (0.38) (1.33) (-0.07) 
β 0.7668 0.9608 0.7292 0.9202 0.0817 0.0590 0.7456 0.9422 0.7036 0.9677 0.0068 -0.0337 0.7682 0.9475 0.7211 1.0180 0.0714 -0.0255
(18.82) (30.94) (13.73) (28.97) (1.66) (1.36) (15.96) (33.91) (13.72) (21.57) (0.16) (-0.89) (17.96) (27.76) (14.16) (21.96) (2.01) (-0.71) 
s ― 0.7943 ― 0.8104 ― -0.0637 ― 0.8215 ― 1.0589 ― -0.1675 ― 0.8626 ― 1.0649 ― -0.1756
(18.70) (15.46) (-0.96) (23.06) (16.87) (-3.09) (25.63) (17.37) (-3.27) 
h ― -0.0819 ― 0.6079 ― -0.7050 ― -0.0239 ― 0.7065 ― -0.6651 ― -0.0270 ― 0.6457 ― -0.6850
(-0.95) (8.50) (-8.13) (-0.43) (9.05) (-9.29) (-0.38) (7.47) (-9.12) 
δ -0.4758 -1.0101 -0.0826 -0.5962 0.1349 0.4670 -0.4290 -0.6628 0.1762 -0.4581 -0.1593 0.0486 -0.2008 -0.6705 0.1279 -0.5228 0.1417 0.4794
(-1.94) (-2.99) (-0.56) (-2.26) (1.34) (2.52) (-1.78) (-3.21) (1.01) (-2.68) (-0.92) (0.31) (-0.99) (-3.02) (0.64) (-2.71) (0.75) (2.18)
ω 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(2.24) (2.47) (1.53) (1.14) (2.32) (1.13) (1.76) (2.54) (1.23) (0.97) (1.75) (1.89) (1.42) (1.97) (1.17) (2.25) (1.58) (1.79)
γ 0.2316 0.2274 0.1965 0.1757 0.2766 0.1391 0.2645 0.3274 0.1758 0.1521 0.2526 0.3033 0.1491 0.2871 0.1411 0.2051 0.1836 0.2010
(2.66) (2.08) (2.81) (2.76) (2.76) (2.41) (2.43) (2.26) (2.75) (2.89) (3.04) (4.18) (1.90) (2.01) (3.04) (2.81) (2.51) (2.50)
θ 0.5783 0.5558 0.7871 0.8164 0.7060 0.8581 0.4998 0.5079 0.8034 0.8468 0.7275 0.6882 0.7959 0.5742 0.8280 0.7152 0.7779 0.7192
(4.34) (3.88) (11.24) (12.78) (13.92) (14.77) (2.52) (3.80) (10.87) (14.69) (9.35) (9.51) (8.00) (3.93) (11.55) (8.64) (9.79) (7.43)
γ +θ 0.8099 0.7832 0.9836 0.9921 0.9826 0.9972 0.7643 0.8352 0.9792 0.9989 0.9801 0.9916 0.9450 0.8613 0.9691 0.9203 0.9615 0.9202
Momentum Winner
Holding period of 3 months Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
MomentumLoser Momentum Winner LoserWinner Loser
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Table 5 – Akaike’s information criterion 
 
The table reports Akaike’s information criterion for three specifications of the market model (MM) and the Fama and French model (FFM). 
These specifications are the static model, the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M model and the GARCH(1,1)-M model. Winner (Loser) is an equally-
weighted non-overlapping portfolio containing the 10% of stocks that performed the best (worst) over a given ranking period. Momentum is 
a portfolio that buys the winner portfolio and short sells the loser portfolio. The highlighted entries denote the minimum values for each 
ranking and holding period. 
 
MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months
Static -3.5705 -4.7005 -3.0319 -3.6139 -3.2293 -3.2527 -3.4921 -4.5723 -3.0299 -3.6719 -3.1306 -3.1827 -3.3852 -4.4449 -3.1774 -3.9119 -3.2506 -3.3900
GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M -3.8980 -4.9116 -3.2531 -3.9252 -3.6228 -3.6636 -4.0527 -5.0383 -3.3035 -4.1226 -3.5992 -3.7186 -3.8670 -4.8225 -3.4542 -4.3080 -3.8732 -3.8994
GARCH(1,1)-M -3.8930 -4.9180 -3.2528 -3.9117 -3.5990 -3.6371 -3.9968 -5.0433 -3.2382 -4.0912 -3.5884 -3.7129 -3.8314 -4.8120 -3.3521 -4.2663 -3.8580 -3.8925
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months
Static -3.5999 -4.6875 -2.9686 -3.5447 -3.0217 -3.1060 -3.5918 -4.7269 -3.0307 -3.6506 -3.1062 -3.1966 -3.5481 -4.6835 -3.1310 -3.7894 -3.1561 -3.2989
GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M -4.0511 -5.1124 -3.2896 -3.9190 -3.3642 -3.6043 -4.0917 -5.1440 -3.3278 -4.0353 -3.5974 -3.7318 -3.9930 -5.0968 -3.3462 -4.0672 -3.6856 -3.7464
GARCH(1,1)-M -4.0545 -5.1138 -3.1718 -3.8702 -3.4429 -3.5613 -4.0238 -5.1474 -3.2341 -4.0151 -3.5494 -3.6994 -3.9647 -5.0967 -3.2905 -4.0503 -3.6769 -3.7447
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months
Static -3.6854 -4.7215 -3.1856 -3.6968 -3.1413 -3.2469 -3.6710 -4.7510 -3.0987 -3.7613 -3.1607 -3.3108 -3.6950 -4.8780 -3.1833 -3.8806 -3.3297 -3.5177
GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M -4.1297 -4.9484 -3.4974 -4.0284 -3.5332 -3.5948 -3.9877 -5.1261 -3.3148 -4.0819 -3.5212 -3.6705 -4.0313 -5.2009 -3.3404 -4.0422 -3.6828 -3.7880
GARCH(1,1)-M -4.0490 -4.9548 -3.3972 -3.9636 -3.4861 -3.5878 -3.9936 -5.1250 -3.2375 -3.9895 -3.5142 -3.6411 -3.9855 -5.1837 -3.2587 -4.0371 -3.6703 -3.7954
Momentum Winner Loser Momentum
Holding period of 3 months Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser
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Table 6 - Mean return and p-values for momentum strategies for various ranking and holding periods for US Data. 
 
Winner (Loser) is an equally-weighted non-overlapping portfolio containing the 10% of stocks that performed the best (worst) over a given 
ranking period. Momentum is a portfolio that buys the winner portfolio and sells the loser portfolio short. Returns are measured as 
proportions rather than percentages. Reward-to-risk ratio is the ratio of the monthly mean to the monthly standard deviation. The p-values in 
parentheses are for the significance of the mean. They are based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust (Newey-West) standard 
errors. 
 
Holding period of 3 months Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months
Mean 0.0117 0.0056 0.0061 0.0123 0.0034 0.0089 0.0123 0.0036 0.0087
p-value (0.00) (0.20) (0.05) (0.00) (0.42) (0.00) (0.00) (0.32) (0.00)
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months
Mean 0.0154 0.0008 0.0147 0.0145 0.0007 0.0139 0.0132 0.0012 0.0120
p-value (0.00) (0.85) (0.00) (0.00) (0.87) (0.00) (0.00) (0.76) (0.00)
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months
Mean 0.0166 -0.001 0.0171 0.0154 -0.0010 0.0163 0.0122 0.0010 0.0112
p-value (0.00) (0.89) (0.00) (0.00) (0.81) (0.00) (0.00) (0.80) (0.00)
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Table 7 - Static market and Fama and French models for US Data 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates for equations (1) and (2) for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. Winner (Loser) is an 
equally-weighted non-overlapping portfolio containing the 10% of stocks that performed the best (worst) over a given ranking period. 
Momentum is a portfolio that buys the winner portfolio and short sells the loser portfolio. α measures the portfolio abnormal performance, β 
measures the market risk of the portfolio, s and h are the portfolio loadings on the size and book-to-market value factors as measured by 
Fama and French (1993). MM refers to the market model and FFM refers to the Fama and French model. White’s heteroscedasticity robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. 
 
MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months
α -0.0002 -0.0021 -0.0070 -0.0082 0.0067 0.0062 0.0003 -0.0015 -0.0091 -0.0106 0.0094 0.0091 0.0000 -0.0018 -0.0084 -0.0096 0.0084 0.0078
(-0.11) (-1.36) (-2.45) (-3.05) (2.21) (1.90) (0.14) (-1.05) (-3.44) (-4.44) (3.81) (3.38) (0.00) (-1.17) (-3.82) (-4.93) (3.83) (3.63)
β 1.2058 1.1486 1.3507 1.2593 -0.1448 -0.1107 1.2283 1.1585 1.3129 1.2391 -0.0846 -0.0806 1.3144 1.2370 1.1910 1.1278 0.1234 0.1093
(20.19) (13.57) (19.12) (16.57) (-1.75) (-1.20) (22.22) (16.93) (20.26) (16.34) (-1.22) (-1.19) (21.82) (15.94) (22.33) (15.50) (1.74) (1.42)
s 0.8141 0.8650 -0.0508 0.8710 0.8303 0.0407 0.9282 0.7031 0.2250
(3.80) (5.78) (-0.30) (5.11) (4.99) (0.38) (4.74) (5.25) (2.02)
h 0.2004 0.1207 0.0797 0.1883 0.1577 0.0306 0.1919 0.1314 0.0604
(1.63) (0.85) (0.44) (1.94) (1.21) (0.25) (1.57) (1.26) (0.51)
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months
α 0.0031 0.0016 -0.0115 -0.0127 0.0146 0.0143 0.0020 0.0011 -0.0114 -0.0129 0.0134 0.0141 0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0108 -0.0115 0.0115 0.0105
(1.37) (1.11) (-3.99) (-4.54) (4.51) (4.13) (0.93) (0.81) (-4.05) (-4.72) (4.52) (4.29) (0.29) (-0.71) (-4.39) (-5.10) (4.78) (4.16)
β 1.2834 1.2107 1.3081 1.2218 -0.0247 -0.0111 1.3048 1.2125 1.2572 1.1855 0.0476 0.0270 1.3586 1.2856 1.1958 1.1020 0.1628 0.1836
(22.39) (14.26) (19.05) (15.67) (-0.28) (-0.12) (22.93) (14.33) (19.07) (14.60) (0.58) (0.28) (24.44) (18.08) (19.55) (13.80) (2.26) (2.27)
s 0.7969 0.8084 -0.0115 0.7656 0.8314 -0.0659 0.8587 0.7298 0.1289
(3.72) (4.99) (-0.07) (3.56) (5.25) (-0.40) (4.96) (4.69) (1.31)
h 0.1457 0.1102 0.0355 0.0723 0.1648 -0.0925 0.1732 0.0515 0.1217
(1.19) (0.72) (0.18) (0.58) (1.16) (-0.54) (1.67) (0.43) (1.05)
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months
α 0.0038 0.0036 -0.0125 -0.0138 0.0163 0.0174 0.0027 0.0026 -0.0131 -0.0147 0.0157 0.0172 -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0108 -0.0127 0.0102 0.0116
(1.73) (2.38) (-4.62) (-4.94) (5.15) (4.89) (1.24) (1.78) (-4.94) (-5.63) (5.27) (5.29) (-0.31) (-0.87) (-4.25) (-5.23) (3.71) (4.00)
β 1.3729 1.2558 1.2014 1.1341 0.1716 0.1217 1.3604 1.2400 1.2268 1.1632 0.1336 0.0768 1.3866 1.2821 1.1740 1.1245 0.2126 0.1575
(24.99) (15.65) (17.33) (13.70) (1.85) (1.15) (25.64) (15.53) (19.03) (15.31) (1.64) (0.80) (28.86) (16.65) (18.45) (16.36) (2.92) (1.87)
s 0.7214 0.7224 -0.0010 0.7102 0.7870 -0.0768 0.7276 0.7879 -0.0603
(3.65) (5.07) (-0.01) (3.60) (5.63) (-0.49) (3.71) (5.94) (-0.40)
h -0.0229 0.1280 -0.1509 -0.0377 0.1689 -0.2066 0.0179 0.2117 -0.1938
(-0.20) (0.94) (-0.85) (-0.32) (1.31) (-1.23) (0.16) (1.68) (-1.18)
Momentum
Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum Winner
Holding period of 3 months
Loser
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Table 8 - Conditional market and Fama and French models with a GJR-GARCH (1, 1)-M term for US Data   
The table reports coefficient estimates for systems (3) and (4) for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. Winner (Loser) is an equally-
weighted non-overlapping portfolio containing the 10% of stocks that performed the best (worst) over a given ranking period. Momentum is 
a portfolio that buys the winner portfolio and short sells the loser portfolio. α measures the portfolio abnormal performance, β measures the 
market risk of the portfolio, s and h are the portfolio loadings on the size and book-to-market value factors as measured by Fama and French 
(1993), tδσ  is the time-varying risk exposure. The conditional variance of the portfolio returns follows a GJR-GARCH(1,1) structure as 
2
1
2
11
2
1
2
−−−− +++= ttttt I θσεηγεωσ , where ω, γ, η and  θ are estimated parameters and It-1 takes a value of 1, when εt-1 is negative and a value 
of 0, otherwise. MM refers to the market model and FFM refers to the Fama and French model. Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust t-statistics are 
in parentheses.  
 
MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months
α -0.0248 -0.0087 -0.0115 -0.0133 0.0245 0.0253 -0.0391 0.0171 -0.0207 -0.0133 0.0143 0.0159 0.0005 -0.0073 -0.0064 -0.0189 0.0093 0.0124
(-2.51) (-1.74) (-1.09) (-2.97) (3.40) (3.42) (-2.67) (1.46) (-2.72) (-3.62) (2.84) (3.08) (0.04) (-1.05) (-0.91) (-4.94) (1.51) (1.95)
β 1.1271 1.0513 1.1243 1.0959 0.0346 0.0095 1.1675 1.0877 1.1518 1.0468 0.0559 0.0261 1.2776 1.1693 1.1252 1.0158 0.1040 0.0934
(32.96) (42.37) (13.79) (21.68) (0.75) (0.18) (31.72) (37.89) (29.14) (31.71) (1.45) (0.60) (31.22) (34.54) (28.55) (31.95) (3.20) (2.55)
s 1.0197 1.0474 0.0156 1.0988 1.0313 0.0837 1.0943 0.9380 0.1798
(28.28) (12.06) (0.22) (29.23) (20.20) (1.43) (24.68) (19.43) (3.44)
h -0.0209 0.0848 -0.1052 0.0614 0.0831 -0.1046 0.1646 0.0095 -0.0267
(-0.52) (1.32) (-1.21) (1.47) (1.41) (-1.47) (3.53) (0.18) (-0.41)
δ 0.6379 0.2654 0.1217 0.1003 -0.3409 -0.3463 1.0231 -0.7667 0.2944 0.0880 -0.1184 -0.1404 -0.0399 0.2105 -0.0440 0.3082 -0.0319 -0.1223
(2.32) (1.30) (0.52) (0.72) (-1.96) (-1.93) (2.63) (-1.58) (1.60) (0.70) (-0.82) (-0.95) (-0.12) (0.72) (-0.22) (2.14) (-0.17) (-0.64)
ω 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(2.43) (2.87) (2.07) (1.90) (2.72) (2.71) (2.24) (1.80) (3.21) (2.30) (2.01) (2.04) (1.78) (7.15) (1.60) (2.37) (1.73) (1.70)
γ 0.4716 0.4717 -0.0057 -0.0157 0.4838 0.4857 0.2845 0.0550 -0.0036 0.0442 0.5406 0.5203 0.1017 0.0295 0.0250 0.0606 0.2762 0.2412
(2.65) (3.43) (-0.19) (-0.39) (3.37) (3.27) (2.06) (0.69) (-0.18) (0.91) (3.03) (2.92) (1.69) (0.37) (0.85) (1.23) (2.05) (2.02)
η -0.3916 -0.3296 0.4769 0.6649 -0.5105 -0.5105 -0.2585 0.1486 0.2371 0.5284 -0.4020 -0.3968 0.0472 -0.0419 0.1188 0.3862 -0.1068 -0.1011
(-2.31) (-2.07) (3.04) (3.68) (-3.46) (-3.37) (-1.94) (0.97) (4.19) (3.19) (-2.33) (-2.33) (0.58) (-0.29) (2.15) (2.70) (-0.85) (-0.90)
θ 0.4973 0.4913 0.6899 0.6744 0.7281 0.7202 0.5557 0.4380 0.8421 0.6822 0.6211 0.6320 0.6957 0.4779 0.9009 0.7274 0.6944 0.7330
(3.67) (5.57) (6.36) (12.44) (11.61) (10.98) (3.69) (1.52) (30.39) (9.28) (6.08) (6.20) (5.38) (6.74) (23.87) (11.57) (6.25) (7.31)
γ +η /2+θ 0.7731 0.7982 0.9226 0.9911 0.9566 0.9506 0.7109 0.5674 0.9570 0.9905 0.9607 0.9540 0.8210 0.4864 0.9853 0.9811 0.9172 0.9236
Holding period of 3 months
Loser Momentum
Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum Winner
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Table 8 - Continued 
 
MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months
α -0.0174 -0.0028 -0.0039 -0.0197 0.0192 0.0203 -0.0117 0.0014 0.0014 -0.0142 0.0085 0.0112 -0.2392 -0.0160 0.0015 -0.0174 0.0008 0.0032
(-1.91) (-0.51) (-0.52) (-3.18) (2.82) (2.89) (-1.22) (0.17) (0.17) (-3.11) (0.89) (1.11) (-1.45) (-1.91) (0.25) (-3.23) (0.08) (0.30)
β 1.2400 1.1250 1.1771 1.0552 0.1688 0.1453 1.2786 1.1372 1.0883 1.0537 0.1658 0.0677 1.3557 1.1951 1.0790 0.9493 0.2068 0.2343
(34.06) (40.46) (26.58) (15.66) (3.92) (2.80) (36.76) (42.06) (21.92) (29.77) (3.73) (1.43) (33.14) (38.90) (24.69) (28.10) (4.95) (4.73)
s 1.0736 0.9813 0.0004 1.0342 0.9924 -0.0038 1.0232 0.8273 0.1708
(29.40) (11.67) (0.01) (28.03) (17.17) (-0.05) (25.07) (15.63) (2.44)
h -0.0697 0.2133 -0.0866 -0.1439 0.2158 -0.3584 -0.0299 -0.1060 0.1019
(-1.50) (2.55) (-0.99) (-3.60) (3.36) (-4.68) (-0.60) (-1.81) (1.22)
δ 0.5419 0.1743 -0.1789 0.1440 -0.0802 -0.0923 0.3632 -0.0308 -0.2375 -0.0126 0.1617 0.1438 6.0567 0.5939 -0.2955 0.1752 0.2716 0.1911
(2.09) (0.65) (-1.00) (0.79) (-0.49) (-0.55) (1.32) (-0.08) (-1.19) (-0.08) (0.72) (0.61) (1.44) (1.62) (-1.90) (1.02) (0.96) (0.70)
ω 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0005 0.0009 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002
(2.35) (2.60) (2.03) (3.47) (3.89) (3.67) (2.16) (1.59) (1.81) (2.59) (2.09) (1.97) (2.37) (4.22) (1.20) (2.36) (1.94) (1.83)
γ 0.3611 0.1885 -0.0043 0.1285 0.8697 0.8612 0.2314 0.0120 -0.0230 0.0266 0.5761 0.5012 0.0159 0.3516 -0.0119 0.0261 0.3063 0.2866
(2.85) (3.40) (-0.26) (1.55) (3.65) (3.46) (2.78) (0.34) (-0.91) (0.92) (2.44) (2.31) (1.23) (5.39) (-0.84) (0.68) (2.55) (2.57)
η -0.3564 -0.1121 0.4418 0.6588 -0.7945 -0.7886 -0.2195 0.2999 0.4435 0.7130 -0.5347 -0.4499 -0.0236 -0.0613 0.2101 0.4028 -0.2895 -0.2736
(-2.76) (-1.65) (2.93) (3.26) (-3.26) (-3.08) (-2.65) (1.88) (3.63) (3.79) (-2.21) (-2.00) (-1.17) (-0.44) (2.93) (3.02) (-2.29) (-2.36)
θ 0.6556 0.7499 0.7618 0.4320 0.4141 0.4164 0.7684 0.3713 0.7966 0.6056 0.5783 0.5684 0.3807 0.2814 0.8716 0.7358 0.7149 0.7590
(6.24) (13.14) (11.89) (5.77) (4.16) (4.05) (9.68) (1.13) (11.77) (7.27) (4.07) (3.52) (1.55) (2.80) (22.67) (10.24) (6.95) (8.23)
γ +η /2+θ 0.8385 0.8823 0.9784 0.8899 0.8865 0.8832 0.8901 0.5333 0.9954 0.9887 0.8871 0.8447 0.3847 0.6024 0.9648 0.9633 0.8765 0.9087
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months
α 0.0030 0.0026 -0.0067 -0.0215 0.0258 0.0286 0.0032 0.0021 -0.0033 -0.0165 0.0179 0.0204 0.0040 -0.0011 -0.0018 -0.0134 0.0081 0.0073
(0.29) (0.81) (-1.21) (-4.72) (2.79) (3.16) (0.29) (0.43) (-0.55) (-3.55) (2.08) (2.25) (0.31) (-0.29) (-0.27) (-3.09) (0.83) (0.75)
β 1.3219 1.2280 1.0630 0.8895 0.3319 0.2280 1.3202 1.1897 1.1213 0.9930 0.2680 0.1579 1.3647 1.2234 1.1108 0.9746 0.2612 0.1955
(34.24) (36.83) (23.09) (16.85) (6.35) (3.98) (33.08) (40.93) (28.55) (25.29) (5.97) (2.96) (33.20) (39.34) (28.86) (29.91) (6.33) (4.12)
s 0.9638 0.7626 0.1328 0.9585 0.8347 0.0667 1.0089 0.7669 0.1821
(14.94) (11.46) (1.73) (25.01) (16.10) (0.85) (19.30) (16.85) (2.56)
h -0.0862 0.0186 -0.3464 -0.1481 0.1778 -0.4090 -0.0879 0.0274 -0.2614
(-1.81) (0.34) (-4.37) (-3.13) (2.89) (-4.94) (-1.88) (0.47) (-3.23)
δ 0.0163 0.0279 -0.1290 0.2298 -0.1674 -0.1858 -0.0230 -0.0412 -0.2334 0.0194 -0.0212 -0.0278 -0.1309 -0.0068 -0.2326 0.0088 0.0927 0.1235
(0.06) (0.21) (-0.93) (1.73) (-0.85) (-0.95) (-0.07) (-0.19) (-1.52) (0.13) (-0.11) (-0.14) (-0.35) (-0.04) (-1.34) (0.06) (0.41) (0.54)
ω 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(1.72) (2.62) (1.76) (2.28) (2.33) (2.50) (1.58) (3.16) (1.60) (2.25) (1.81) (1.92) (1.53) (4.04) (1.67) (1.56) (1.41) (1.34)
γ 0.1941 0.6725 0.0019 0.0140 0.5729 0.6220 0.1834 0.4409 0.0079 0.0238 0.3752 0.4545 0.1460 0.6199 0.0106 0.0516 0.2348 0.1657
(2.47) (1.48) (0.07) (0.43) (2.71) (2.89) (2.47) (6.34) (0.32) (0.65) (2.62) (2.45) (2.18) (1.00) (0.67) (1.43) (2.10) (2.07)
η -0.2081 -0.5849 0.3501 0.4977 -0.5216 -0.5511 -0.1670 -0.2973 0.2808 0.6291 -0.3580 -0.4207 -0.0788 -0.1905 0.1391 0.4295 -0.2212 -0.1517
(-2.56) (-1.33) (3.07) (3.24) (-2.48) (-2.56) (-2.25) (-2.41) (2.59) (3.42) (-2.52) (-2.28) (-0.97) (-0.36) (2.83) (3.56) (-2.01) (-1.92)
θ 0.7963 0.6000 0.8042 0.7242 0.6004 0.5592 0.7861 0.6202 0.8484 0.6555 0.7677 0.6812 0.7352 0.3625 0.9095 0.7200 0.8353 0.8717
(8.57) (5.56) (29.48) (10.40) (5.43) (5.01) (7.91) (8.71) (15.79) (10.32) (10.43) (6.56) (5.32) (2.40) (29.04) (9.22) (11.20) (14.78)
γ +η /2+θ 0.8864 0.9800 0.9811 0.9870 0.9125 0.9056 0.8860 0.9125 0.9967 0.9938 0.9638 0.9254 0.8417 0.8871 0.9897 0.9864 0.9595 0.9616
Holding period of 3 months
Loser Momentum
Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum Winner
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